Articles, videos, and tweets are scattered here and there about the necessity of finding a solution in Egypt regarding the issue of detainees and the entire political situation, which for the first time in contemporary Egyptian history we have reached. However, everyone points the finger of blame at the Muslim Brotherhood, suggesting that the solution may lie in the group dissolving itself or announcing its withdrawal from political activity altogether.
However, all these demands have never come from Egyptian regime media or its affiliates, or from supplementary media, whether on television channels, newspapers, or even social media. Instead, they originate either from within the group itself or from parties that were once part of the group in one way or another and are now outside it.
In my opinion, many of those making these demands ignore numerous questions, and none of them provide answers. For the sake of history and this pivotal moment, I will outline some of the questions I remember, hoping to find answers from them.
But before we list those questions, we need to accurately and clearly describe the current Egyptian political reality, which I believe is represented as follows:
We are faced with a strong Egyptian regime that is militarily and security-wise dominant over the entire country from all aspects. It exploits the existence of this group to keep the people obedient and secure, regardless of their way of life or living conditions. Additionally, the regime's exploitation of this group extends to its foreign policy, whether in securing aid to combat terrorism or in using the idea of maintaining Israel's security against the presence of Islamists on its borders, especially after October 7, 2023, and the military operation carried out by Hamas, which is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, despite claims to the contrary regarding Israel and the Arab and Western regimes.
On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood itself is suffering greatly, whether on the local Egyptian level, the regional level, or the international level. The majority of Arab countries have classified the group as a terrorist organization for over seven years, while others that have not classified it treat it as a supporter of terrorism or influential in its presence. On the local Egyptian level, the group has no power except for a mitotic division into three currents, each with problems with the others, whether ideological, administrative, or strategic, making the battle more internal than a confrontation with the current Egyptian regime.
From the above, we can say that we are facing a strong, cohesive regime with influential international and regional supporters, with a clear Gulf influence on American policy regarding the classification of the group and the rise of far-right or conservative currents in most Western countries, while Islamic movements of all kinds are experiencing a level of weakness and decline not seen in recent decades.
Here, we must find answers to those questions that come to mind and cannot be ignored in the demands of many for the group to dissolve itself, believing that the solution lies in this and that the Egyptian or regional regime will treat this solution as the end of the matter.
The first of these questions is: What would drive the Egyptian regime to actually change its policies if the group ceased to exist?
The regime did not rely solely on the presence of the Brotherhood to tighten its grip, even though they were the most significant reason for its existence. Instead, it is based on a complete political, economic, and security engineering that ensures every aspect of the state is managed with a mentality of control rather than participation. If the group is ineffective, divided, and pursued, with no influence in the street, institutions, or public space, how could its dissolution be a reason for political relief? What would actually change in the balance of power?
The second question: Does the regime even have an interest in the group's disappearance?
Its existenceâin its current weak formâprovides a constant cover for continuing the âprotection from chaosâ approach, justifying the tight security structures, and is used in its internal and external rhetoric. The complete absence of the group might create a vacuum that the regime would need to fill with a âsubstitute enemy,â and perhaps open the door to political demands it does not want to emerge.
Then comes a third, very important question: Will the dissolution of the group actually lead to the release of detainees?
Previous experiences, both locally and regionally, indicate that security files are not closed through concessions from one side, but rather through comprehensive political understandings that involve multiple parties and ensure clear guarantees, which none of those calling for dissolution provide. Moreover, the regime has never officially linked the existence of the group to the continuation of arrests, nor has it announced that its absence would lead to reciprocal steps, especially in light of the complete regional opposition to the presence of any Islamic current engaged in politics, particularly with the influential Emirati role in Egypt.
We have the example of the Islamic Group in Egypt, which is still accused of the same charges despite its famous declarations of review and cessation of violence. However, when it took a stance similar to most Islamic parties after June 2014, it became classified like the Brotherhood.
And a fourth question: Who is supposed to announce the dissolution, and who is supposed to receive the âdissolution announcementâ?
Does the current leadership of the groupâwith its three currentsâhave sufficient internal legitimacy to issue a decision of this magnitude? Will any international or regional party recognize a decision that is not internally agreed upon? The reality suggests that this proposal is closer to political fantasy than to a practical solution. Even if we assume there is internal agreement, who will take this decision, affirm it, and give it the legal international status necessary to announce the death of this group and cease the pursuit of its members?
The fifth question: If the group has weakened and its influence has diminished to this extent, what is the point of discussing its dissolution?
If its reality is as described by these parties, why does the âdissolution of a dead entityâ become a condition for political reform? This contradiction alone reveals the fragility of the hypothesis underlying the proposal.
The sixth question: Will the Egyptian regime or regional regimes be convinced that the solution has been achieved and that the group no longer exists after its dissolution?
What about the individuals in the group? Will they be pursued for not confirming whether they have dissolved themselves or not?
The seventh question: How do we distinguish an Ikhwani person from a non-Ikhwani person? Is there a specific mechanism for Arab and international regimes to determine this issue?
What we find now is that anyone who criticizes any Arab regime, especially in North Africa and the Gulf, is immediately labeled as Ikhwani. In Egypt, many liberal currents and even some Christians have been classified as Brotherhood simply for their opposition. So, who will determine what?
Finally, the eighth question: Will the dissolution of the group resolve the political crisis in Egypt?
The Egyptian crisis is much larger than any single group; it is a crisis of political, economic, and institutional structures that have accumulated over many years. Reducing it to one groupâwhether dissolved or remainingâwill not change the nature of the crisis or its depth.
Such articles and analyses require a conclusion, but I will spare myself from providing one this time due to the depth of the crisis and the difficulty of exiting it without the Egyptian regime and other regional regimes deciding that the solution begins from where they determine, not from where the other partyâwhich is, at best, a dead entityâdecides. Moreover, those calling for this type of solution must provide real answers to all these questions, and more importantly, the guarantees.
An Egyptian programmer and political analyst specializing in security and strategic analysis, interested in human-rights activism and providing technical support to human-rights organizations.
